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Agents in the public or private sectors often follow one systemic set
ofactions whentheir environment lies within some prescribed boundaries
andswitch to anotherset of actions when the boundaries are reached.
Theirrecognition of the presence of the boundaries ties the two sets of
actionstogether. In previous work, we have studied economic behavior in
similar situations, but we found it difficult to produce closed form
solutions. Jj
Recently, several authors have investigated this class of problems
with a set of tools that readily generates closed form solutions in a
stochastic setting. The new research, aimed at issues in exchange rate
policy, has been due to Smith (1987), Krugman (1987. 1988). Smith and
Smith (1988), Miller (1988), Klein (1988), and Froot and Obstfeld (1989).
Additionalwork in a .iicroeconomic setting has been carried out by Krugman
(1987), Bertola (1987), and Dixit (1987, 1988).
Allthis recent work was partly stimulatedbythe publication of
Harrison (1985), whichshowshow to derive closed form solutions for a
variety of problems in controlled Erownian motion. Harrison's results
make iteasy toimplement the idea thattheanticipation of "bumping Into"
the boundaries generates important nonlinearities that are not well
modeled by linear approximations.
j/ In Flood and Garber (1980. 1983b), we studied the impact of an
endogenous triggering of monetary reform on the current price level inthe
Germanhyperinflation. In Flood andCarber(1983a). we considered the
determination of the current floating exchange rate when the regime would
switch to a fixed rate system at an endogenously determined, random tirue.-2-
In this paper, we will arbitrage yet another result from Harrison
(1985) into the study of exchange rate target zones. We will generalize
the target zone (TZ) exchange rate as model formalized by Krugman (1988W
and extended by Froot and Obstfeld (1989). 1.!theItrugi.anitbears some
resemblance to the European Monetary System (EMS), where members agree to
maintain their exchange rates within prespecified bands. While the EMS
recognizes the possibility of occasional band shifts (devaluations), we
will study a system in which the exchange rate bands are permanent. 2/
Themain contribution of these pages consists of linking the recent
developments in the theory of target zones to the mirror-image theory of
speculative attacks on asset price fixing regimes. j/ We also use aspects
of this linkiage to provide an intuitive interpretation of the "smooth
pasting" condition, generally invoked as a terminal condition in this
literature.
We aim to unify these two literatures by showing that the solution
concepts in both are identical. Indeed, we can show that in the TZ
context speculative attacks must generally occur as a result of a policy
to defend the zone. 4/ Thus, Krugman's recent (1987, 1988) work is
j/ The KrugmanTZ is in spirit a simplified version of the TZ blueprint
offered by Williamson and Miller (1987).
2/TheTZ models can readily be integrated with models of speculative
attacks either of the buying or selling varieties, ifa limit is placed on
the amount of reserves or bonds that the authorities are willing to buy or
sell to defend the zone.
VForsome literature on speculative attacks, see Salant and
Henderson (1978), Krugman (1979) Salant (1983), Flood and Carber (l984a,
b), and Obstfeld (1984 1986).
4/ ecause of the upper and lower bounds in a TZ, these may be either
buying or selling attacks as in Grilli (1985).-3-
actually &•teptoward coming full circle on his (1979) contribution on
balance-of-payments crises.
We derive our results in the two remaining sections. In Section II,
wepresent the exchange rate TZ problem in a standard exchange rate model.
The TZ literature developed thus far has considered only the case of
infinitesimal interventions. A closed-form solution for the exchange
rate for the case of discrete-sized interventions can be read directly
from results in Harrison (1985), however. Therefore, we simply reproduce
the relevant problem from Harrison and indicate those properties of
Harrison'. solution which convey economic intuition about boundary
conditions. In Section III, we restudy the IZ problem in the ilanner of
Krugman and of Froot and Obstfeld using the boundary conditions developed
in Harrison for discrete interventions. We also extend the analysis to
situations in which the policy authority may use discrete interventions of
uncertain magnitude to keep the exchange rate within possibly stochastic
boundaries. Finally, we also examine the interest rate implications of
adopting a TZ in this model and conclude by placing the current analysts
in a broader perspective.
II. A Model of Tarzet Zones
The TZ is a nonlinear compromise between fixed exchange rates and
freely flexible exchange rates. The basic idea of the exchange rate TZ is
that a country or group of countries sets explicit margins within which
exchange rates will be allowed to fluctuate. While the exchange rate is
within those boundaries, policy can be directed toward other goals. When
the boundary is reached, the policy maker focuses resources on maintaining-4-
the boundaries. The TZ does not preclude foreign exchange interventions
inside the boundaries. Indeed, the TZ studied by Xrug.an simply does not
specify govenu.ent behavior inside the TZ boundaries, Of course, this is
the point of the TZ. While the exchange rate iiinsidethe band, policy
can be directed as desired toward goal. other than fixing the exchange
rate. JJ
Xrugman(1988) was able to characterize the behavior of the exchange
rate within a target zone when exchange rates are driven by reeulated
3rownian notion. Regulated Brownian notion is Brownian notion with
occasional intervention by a regulator, which we identify as a policy
authority. In Krugman's case, the unregulated fundamentals follow
nondrifting Brownian motion. The intervention which regulates the process
is triggered by the edges of the TZ, which are syimietricabout zero.
Froot and Obstfeld (1989) extend Krugman's results to the case of
fundamentals following Browniannotionwith constant drift and to
nonsyimEetric zones. 2/
/ Thereis no claim that such a nonlinear setting of policy would be
welfare improving compared to linear nonsterilized intervention in
response to a set of indicator variables. In fact, for fairly general
quadratic welfare functions, the optimal policy is linear. Therefore, the
case for a TZ must rely on, for example, welfare's being poorly modeled by
a quadratic function, the optimal settings of the coefficients in a linear
policy rule being difficult to achieve (with the TZ providing a better
welfare outcome than inappropriate coefficients in a linear policy), or
possibly some multilateral negotiating aspects of a TZ providing a better
chance of reaching a near Pareto optimal policy than would be true for a
linear policy.
2/Obstfeldand Froot (1989) have also extended these results to the
case of a different forcing process, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, and
to the case of absorbing barriers, The absorbing barriers case was
studied by Flood and Carber (1983a) with closed form solutions first
derived by Smith (1987).-S-
W. extend this analysis to allow both a discrete intervention and the
possibility that intervention may be triggered randomly. While both
extensions are required before models of this type can be applied to data.
the ability to obtain solutions for discrete interventions is the more
interesting result. This extension provides the intuitive link between
the earlier literature on discrete attacks on foreign exchange reserves
and clarifies the latitude available to a policy authority while
maintaining the fl
To study the behavior of the exchange rate inside the band, Krugman
and Froot and Obstfeld use a standard law of motion for a flexible price
exchange rate model: Jf
-
(1)x(t) —k(t)+aEfdx(t)I/dt.a >0.
x(t) is the logarithm of the exchange rate, a can be interpreted as the
Cagan interest rate semi-elasticity, and the expectation operator is
conditioned on current inforaation. Only information about the forcing
variable k(t) is relevant to the exchange market. In a standard monetary
approach model, k(t) is a linear combination of the logarithms of foreign
and domestic money supplies, real incomes, money demand disturbances and
real exchange rate movements.
jJThelaw of motion would be generated in the exchange rate models of
Bilson (1978), Frenkel (1978), and Mussa (1978). The same model was
adapted by Flood and Carber (l983a) to a continuous tine stochastic
environment with future exchange rate fixing. The underpinning of the law
of motion would be a Cagan money demand function in two countries,
purchasing power parity, and open interest parity. Other models, of
course, would produce laws of motion for the exchange rate of a similar
form with different interpretations of the forcing variables.-6-
k(t) can be controlled by intervention of the monetary authorities.
Specifically, the authorities can control k(t) to assure that
(2) x>x>x1
where xa and x' are the upper and lower bounds of the exchange rate TZ,
respectively. Krugman and Eroot and Obstfeld assume that the authorities
interfere with the motion of Ic only when x reaches the boundaries of the
TZ. j/ When the exchange rate is inside the TZ boundaries, k follows a
random walk with drift that is independent of the exchange rate: 21
(3)dk —7dt+odz
where q and a are constants and z is a standard Wiener process.
implying that the variance of k over any period tis02t and that
(8k)2 —o2dt(see Harrison (1985) page 65).
1.An exchange rate solution with discrete intervention
Wenow transcribe from Harrison (1985) the closed formexchange rate
solution when intervention isdiscrete. Consider a situation in which the
Browniannotion with drift process Ic is controlled as in Figure 1. When
itis between the bounds k" and k' 1€follows the Brownianmotion process
ofequation (3).When Ic hits the upper bound k". an intervention throws Ic
discontinuously back to the interior point Q —Ic"-1u,where I" measures
Jj Both x and k arefunctions of time, however, we will usually
suppressthe time dependence notation in the following presentation.
2/Krugmanassumes a zero drift parameter. Froot and Obstfeld argued
that the policy specification in Krugaan is incomplete since both discrete
Jumps in kK and infinitesimal interventions are compatible with a given
TZ. They base their discussion on a similar point nade in Obstfeld and
Stockman's(1985) discussion of an indeterminacy in Flood and Carber
(1983a). Nevertheless, they consider only the case of infinitesimal
intervention. It turns out that this case implies intervention only at
the boundaries of the TZ.-7-
the magnitude of intervention. At Q,theprocess resumes the random
action given in equation (3).II k hits the lower bound k1 it is thrown
back to the point q—k' • l Of course, when I" 11_O, we have the
case of Froot and Obstfeld: asymmetric reflecting barriers with
infinitesimal interventions. When, in addition, ij— 0and k" —-id,we
have the symmetric case of Krugman.
These discontinuous shifts in k can be interpreted as interventions
that occur to saintain the exchange rate k within its prescribed bounds.
Krugman implicitly and Froot and Obstfeld explicitly assume that such
interventions are infinitesimal; they associate the attainment of x' with
the simultaneous attainment of lc1.Je doubt, however, that agents
operating in a TZ would be sure that any intervention would be
infinitesimal and would take place only at the TZ boundary. In the
generalization to discrete interventions, these two events will not
coincide. J
Howwill the exchange rate, x, behave under such circumstances? Note
that the exchange rate solution for the differential equation (1) can be
written as:
(4) x —g(k(0))—'E[7 k (r)exp(—c)dr Ik(0)]
The analytical solution of this integral, as well as the layout in
Figure 1. is presented in Harrison (1985). Chapter 3, page 52, problem 13,
j/ Apparently actual interventions by thebundesbankin defense of the
ENSmarginsneither take place only at the declared exchange rate margins
nor is the size of the intervention always related to the proximity of the
margins.-8-
for the case where units are chosen so that xT —0.From special cases
of this solution, it is easy to arbitrage most of the results of the
literature applying controlled rownian notion to economics. For current
purposes, however, we note that the general functional for, of the
solution is exactly that of Krugman and Froot and Obstfeld:
(5) x —g(k)—It+aq+Aexp[A11c) +B.xp(A2kJ
where
1





Fora given U even the constant terms A and B are identical to those of
Krugman and Froot and Obstfeld, thoug)i they are apparently determined by
different boundary conditions.
We graph Harrlion's solution for the function gOt) for the case of
discrete intervention in Figure 2. The functional form in equation (5) is
invariant to the size of the intervention; and I" and I will affect
neither A nor B for a given TZ. Also, it can be shown with some
manipulation that Harrison's solution for x as a function of It is
continuous at It —It"and It — sothat g(k") —g(k"
-I")and
—g(k1+Il).We will present an intuitive argument for this result
and use it as a boundary condition below.-9-
2.A derivation of the fimetional for, of the exchanee rate solution
Our presentationofHarrisons solution for g(Ic)withoutany
development is a bit mysterious. Therefore, we now follow Krugman and
Froot and Obstfeld a to develop the functional form of the solution
presented by Harrison. Suppose that the exchange rate solution is
x —g(k).Ourproblemis to develop the g(k) function explicitly.
If g(k) is the solution then Edx/dt can be derived from the
appropriate differential of the g(k) function. The g(k) function and thus
the exchange rate is driven by k. which follows a Weiner process.
Therefore we must apply Ito differentiation to g(k). According to
Harrison (1985) page 65 we obtain: 1/
(6) dx —g(k)dk• (l/2)g (k)dk2
Nov take the expectation of each side of equation (6). conditional
on current information. Inside the TZ. E(dk) —ndtsince Edz —0.Since
current k is known to agents. Eg'(k)dk —g'(k)Edk—g'(k)vjdt.Further
—o2dt(see Harrison, page 65) so that equation (6) may be rearranged
to become:
(7) Edx]/dt —8(k)i7+(l/2)g(k)a2
Now substitute from equation (7) into equation (1) to find:
jJ The stochastic differential of x is slightly different from the
differential we normally encounter because though the path of the variable
Ic is continuous, it is not differentiable in the normal sense. Conse-
quently the normal rules of differentiation are not applicable and we
must use a slightly different derivative concept, the Ito dervivative as
in equation (6).- 10-
(8)x —g(k)—k+o[g'(k)q• (l/2)g''(k)a21
Equation (8) is a second order linear differential equation, which we
solve by: (1) finding a particular solution; (2) combining the
particular solution with the hosogenous solution; and (3) applying
appropriate boundary conditions.
A particular solution is obtained by ignoringtheTZ. Without the TZ
equations (1) and (3) require x —k+W7,andthis is a particular
solution to equation (8). The homogenous part of the solution is
x —Aexp(4k1+RexptA2kI.The su, of the two parts of the solution is
the general solution given in equation (5) with 4andA2asabove.
Obtaining a complete solution requires application of the appropriate
boundary conditions.
3. Miandaryconditions and the exolicitexebante ratesolution
Thoughthe explicit solution is available with some manipulation of
Harrison's result, we prefer for expositional purposes to develop the
solution for the problem of discrete interventions along the intuitive
lines provided by Krugaan and Froot and Obstfeld. To solve for A and & in
equation (5), Froot and Obstfeld (following Krugman) impose the"smooth
pasting conditions," a requirement that g.(ku) —0and g'(kt) —0.These
two conditions provide sufficient boundary information to determine A
and3.
tosee that these conditions are valid in the cases studied by
Krugman and Froot and Obetfeld, let us consider Figure 2. the diagra.of
Harrison's solution for discrete interventions. Define1çmaI'and as
the solutions of g'(k) —0.Note that Ic"> klUx >Qand< cq.- 11-
Assuringthat the endpoints of the segment defined by I always lie on the
solution curve at the same vertical height, let i" converge to zero.
Similarly, let il converge to zero. Q and Ic" will then converge to
and q and Ic1 will converge to kmin. Therefore, for infinitesimal
interventios, 8(k") —g(k1),the smooth pasting condition. The smooth
pasting condition is applicable for infinitesimal interventions, but it is
inapplicable for finite interventions. Similarly, the assumption that the
TZboundary points are attained simultaneously withtheIc boundary points
is true only in the case of infinitesimal intervention.
4.Continuity at the boundaries
Whatisthe intuition behind the continuity of the exchange rate in
the presence of discrete forseen interventions? This is a natural
requirement familiar from the speculative attack literature. If there
were a discontinuity in response to an anticipated intervention i.e. •if
g(k") did not equal g(k"-V3). there would be a foreseeable profit at an
infinite rate, Speculators would act to remove this opportunity.
Recall that in the speculative attack literature of Krugman (1979) or
Flood and Garber (1984), domestic credit is usually rigged with upward
drift. An attack on a fixed exchange rate system is timed to prevent an
expected discontinuity in exchange rates. In the context of equation (1)
exchange rate continuity in the face of an expected attack on the fixed
rate regime requires the exchange rate to be the same in the instant just
before and the instant just after the attack. Yet, the expected rate of
change of the exchange rate would jump discontinuously from zero to a
positive number, driving down money demand and accomodating the sudden
loss of reserves at the moment of the attack.- 12-
Thelogic for a discrete intervention in a TZ is identical. When the
distance from Ic to k" is infinitesimally small, there will be a shift from
k'' to Qwithprobability one. Since the expected value of the integral
in equation (4) takes account of the shift, its value will not change when
the shift occurs. Now evaluate equation (1) at Ic" and Q,respectively.
and subtract the two results. Since the exchange rate is the same at the
two k values, the result is:
(9) k'' -Q—— -atEdx/dt- Edx/dt
jk—k k—Q
Thediscontinuousshift in It (e.g.. the reduction in foreign reserves or
bond holdingsof the policy authority) exactly offsets the discontinuous
shift in expectations.
In this It problem, the shift in the expected depreciation adjusts to
the arbitrary magnitude of the intervention. In the speculative attack
literature, the magnitude of the intervention adjusts to the specified
shift in expected depreciation rates rigged into the problem. Otherwise.
the problems are identical.
Indeed, there is even a run on reserves in the Timodel.When k
(domestic credit) reaches a high enough level, speculators will approach
the policy authority to convert domestic currency for reserves, thereby
forcing an intervention of the prescribed magnitude. This monetary
alignmentcrisis (MAC Attack) serves to preserve the TZ, however.
The relevant (AS) pair for a specific intervention strategy that
supports a particular It can be found by noting thatx" —g(kma)and
—g(kThi),where u and x1 are the announced TZ bounds. For arbitrary
values of A and B, we can find kma)t and kmit the critical values of g(k),- 13-
asfunctions of A and 5. Substituting these functions into x" —g(kma))
and xt —(kmuhI)yields two equations in the unknowns (A,B). In the
Appendixwe sketch more completely the determination of A and Bfor a
particularintervention strategy.
The continuity condition requires that gUi") —g(k"-1u)and
g(k1 +Il).These twoconditions are also sufficient to determine A and S
in equation (5)asfunctions of the policy quadruple (Ic", Q,q,Ic1). The
pair(AS) associated with a specific TZ can therefore be generated by an
infinite number of combinations of values for the inner and outer bounds
on Ic.
In this sense, simply announcing a specific Ti is not a well-
specified policy. A particular TZ can be supported by an infinity of
intervention strategies. This incompleteness is not an indictment of the
TZ policy, which was designed as a part of a broader policy. Indeed, the
incompleteness of the TZ allows policy to be directed toward other goals
with only occassional attention to the maintenance of the Ti.
5.A discrete intenentioi with 0 ii
Aninteresting case occurs when Q <qas depicted in Figure 3.In
this case, the exchange rate can float downward toward the floor of the Ti
even though It approaches its upper bound, Ic". When Ic teaches k' &large
intervention to reduce It occurs although the exchange rate is near or even
at its minima level. Thus, in a situation in which an intervention to
purchase reserves appears necessary to prevent breaching the floor of the
zone,the intervention instead consists ofa large reserve sale aimed at
preventingthe breaching of the zone's ceiling.- 14-
6.Intervention uncertainty
-
Inour analysis so far we have assumed a preannounced intervention
strategy defending a sharp TZ, i.e.apreannounced pair(1a1l)• In
practice,however, it is unlikely that the intervention strategy would be
precisely preannounced and we find interesting the possibility of "soft
zones, •whichwe formalize as a probability distribution concerning the
boundaries of the TZ. JJ In this situation we need to examine some
additional possibilities to find a formula for x inside the TZ. In
particular, recall that a 'solutioir for the exchange rate must be of the




where n is an intervention strategy y is a TZ boundary pair and f(ny) is
the distribution function giving the appropriate probability density for
any n.y. For any n and for any y we can solve the model conditionally as
above to get the appropriate values of A and B. We then calculate the
unconditional expected rate of change of x from equation (10) and
substitute the result into equation (1) to find the value of the exchange
rate with stochastic intervention policy.
Since the actual intervention can surprise private agents.
intervention can result in seemingly perverse exchange rate movements. To
see this point examine Figure 2.The figure was predicated on the
j,1Weassume an information structure such that there is no learning
about the nature of intervention or the boundaries of the zone. In our
version both the nature of intervention and the soft boundaries will be
random exogenous variables drawn from a time-invariant distribution.- 15-
exchangeauthority's intervening in aaount I" when k reaches its upper
bound. If instead the authority were to intervene by less than I" then
the currency would actually depreciate.
7. Thevolatility ofexchanzeand interest rates
Krugman(1988) showed that the TZ will stabilize the exchange rate.
This result occurs because the function gOt)isalmost everywhere less
responsiveto k than isthe functionalrelation between x and k in a pure
floatingregime.
Yet,the possibilityof achievingsomeexchange rate stability
withoutactually having to intervene has the disturbing appearance of a
free lunch. Where does the volatility go?
To address this question, let us assume that the domestic interest
rate i equals the constant foreign interest rate plus the expected rateof
depreciation. Since the foreign interest rate is constant,the only
volatility in the domestic interest rate stems from movementsin E(ds].
Then
(11) V(i(k),t) —02V(g(k)-k,t)
where V(y,t) is the variance of the variable y over an intervalof length
t.
Forboth fixed and floating exchange rates V(i(k),t) —0 in the
constant drift cases that we have considered. Since g(k) -kis not
constant for the TZ, however, V(i(k),r0 in the target zone. Thus the




Publicand private sector agents often adopt one set of actions when
some indicator is within certain bounds and switch to another set of
actions wtien the boundsarereached.Examplesofsuch action patterns are
widespread in policy making circles and seem to describe a possibly
i.portant part of the policy making process not captured linear rules.
The purpose of the present paper was primarily technical: to extend
the literature to the possibility of finite-sized and stochastic
interventions in defense of the U. IJ0 found the terminal conditions
required both for the finite-size interventions and for the infinitesimal
interventions to be most easily understood by relating them to the
mirror image problem of describing an anticipated speculative attack.- 1.7-
Ante ix
In this Appendix we sketch the developuient of the explicit forirnilas
requited to find A and IwhentheTZis defended by finite interventions.
Recall equation (9) in the text. This equation showstheshift in the
expectedrate, of change of the exchange rate required to accomodate an
intervention of size i". An analogous formula holds, but is not
displayed,for a finite intervention frombelow in size I. Note that the
twoexpected rates of exchange rate change in equation (9) naybe
developed in terms of A and B by usingequations(5) and (7), which imply:
Edx
1k—k"
— qjl+A1AexpA1k" + A2BexpA2k")
+(a2/2)t4AexpA1k" + 4BexpA2k"].
Edx /dt —.j(l+A1AexpA1Q + A2Bexp2Q1
Ik-Q
+ (o2/2)[AAexpA1Q+ABexpA2Q
Thesetwoequations may besubstituted into equation (9) to give one
equationinAand B. A second equation in A and may be developed by
considering intervention at the lower bound, which may be finite as above
or infinitesimal as in Krugman and Froot and Obstfeld.- 18-
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Large Discrete Intervention with QC q
I"
x=g(k)
x41
k